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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
THOMAS M. DOWNS, ESQ.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Widespread environmental awareness has made environmental
enforcement an important political issue. The political climate has fueled
the desire for criminal penalties with sufficient deterrent bite to prevent
environmental transgressions. Legislators and prosecutors have responded
to political and electoral pressures by criminalizing environmental laws and
escalating environmental prosecutions. The business community has
recognized that the targets of criminal prosecution are increasingly
corporate officers and managers.
This Article provides an overview of enforcement efforts at all
levels of government, analyzing who is being targeted for environmental
criminal prosecution, and the general environmental statutes that provide
the legal framework for enforcement. It also discusses the unique
characteristics of environmental crimes, namely, the erosion of the criminal
intent standard. Finally, the Article addresses environmental auditing as
a means of avoiding liability.
II. GROWTH IN THE NUMBER AND SEVERITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMES AND THE INCREASING AGGRESSIVENESS OF FEDERAL AND STATE
PROSECUTION
A. Federal law
At the federal level, prohibited acts that affect the environment can
result in criminal prosecution under two categories of statutory offenses.
The first category involves acts which Congress has made criminally
punishable under various general environmental statutes enacted in the last
two decades. The second category consists of actions which can be
classified as crimes under traditional criminal law provisions such as Title
18 of the United States Code ("U.S.C."). These include false statements,
mail fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and obstruction of
justice. A survey of the first category shows an unmistakable trend toward
0
Thomas M. Downs, Esq. is a partner with Swidler & Berlin, Chid. in Washington,
D.C.
2 WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 17:01
more criminal provisions with harsher penalties, and prosecutors apply the
second category increasingly often in environmental cases.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has primary
responsibility for investigating violations of and enforcing federal
environmental laws. EPA's Office of Enforcement and its National
Enforcement Investigation Center carry out enforcement and investigative
functions. Over the past seven years, EPA referrals of possible criminal
violations of environmental laws to the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
have increased by 300%, prosecutions have increased by 1000%, and
convictions by 700%. In addition, the Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990
requires the EPA to hire and train additional criminal investigators in
increasing numbers over the next five years.' The law mandates that
between October 1991 and September 1992 EPA must bring the number
of criminal investigators to at least seventy-two.' By October 1995, the
total must be 200.3
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") has elevated the Environmental
Crimes Unit to the status of a Section and expanded its size. As of July
1991 the Section had increased its staff from four environmental
prosecutors to thirty four. In January 1991, Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh reported that since the founding of the Environmental Crimes
Section, the prosecutors had returned a total of 761 indictments, resulting
in 549 convictions. 5 This represented a quadrupling of their effort in the
preceding three years and the vast majority of the convictions were
obtained within two years of the announcement. 6 The convictions resulted
in over $57 million in penalties, restitutions and forfeitures, and the
imposition of more than 348 years of jail time.7 In 1990, the conviction
rate was ninety-five percent, with fifty-five percent of convicted
individuals sentenced to prison.' Recently, EPA announced a record
1. Pollution Prosecution Act section 202, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (1990).
2. Id. at § 202(a)(1).
3. Id. at § 202(a)(5).
4. DOJ Plans To Issue Policy Statement on Use of Corporate Environmental Audits,
22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8 at 484 (June 21, 1991).
5. Richard Thomburgh, Our Blue Planet: A Law Enforcement Challenge, Keynote
Address at the 1991 Department of Justice Environmental Law Enforcement
Conference, New Orleans, La. (Jan. 8, 1991).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 1990 Record Year for Criminal Enforcement of Env'tl Violators, Justice Announces,
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 30 at 1397 (November 23, 1990).
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breaking $3 million criminal fine against United Technologies Corporation
which pleaded guilty to six felony violations under Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). 9
B. State and local prosecution
The vigorous nature of federal criminal enforcement should not
overshadow the importance and seriousness of state and local prosecutions.
Although various states have taken different approaches to environmental
crime prosecutions, most are intensifying their efforts.
In New Jersey, for example, the State has made "a significant
commitment of both manpower and resources to the enforcement of
environmental laws and regulations."1 ° New Jersey has had a history of
vigorous criminal enforcement against corporate environmental offenders
as the state's repeated criminal indictments against Ciba Geigy and its
Toms River managers" and its innovative whistle blower statute
illustrate. Various departments such as the Attorney General's office, the
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), and the Board of Public
Utilities have environmental enforcement units.' 2 On January 24, 1990
the Governor of New Jersey created the Office of the State Environmental
Prosecutor ("OSEP") and the State Environmental Prosecutor ("SEP") in
order to centralize and coordinate the state's environmental crime
efforts. 3
In Minnesota, the Attorney General and the Pollution Control
Agency Commissioner have formed the Minnesota Environmental Crimes
Team ("ECT"). 4 That the ECT has achieved some success is evidenced
by the case of Minnesota v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. dibla Marvin
Windows. 5 Following an investigation by ECT, the defendant entered a
9. United States v. United Technologies Corp., No. 2:91CR00028 (D. Conn. filed May
14, 1991).
10. Environmental Prosecutor Appointed in New Jersey, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 41
at 1763 (February 9, 1990).
11. See infra note 43.
12. Environmental Prosecutor Appointed in New Jersey, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 41
at 1763 (February 9, 1990).
13. Robert Hanley, Florio Appoints A Prosecutor for Envt'l Concerns, N.Y. TIMES at
B4, Col. 5 (January 25, 1990).
14. Alan R. Mitchell, The Minnesota Crimes Team, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J.,
July, 1991, at 3.
15. Id.
1992]
4 WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 17:01
guilty plea to the crime of illegal storage of hazardous waste and agreed
to pay a $2 million fine.16
In 1991 the Minnesota legislature also broadened the definition of
"knowing" for purposes of environmental crimes to provide that the
knowledge of a corporate official could be established by proof that the
person was a responsible corporate officer. 7
The theory of "conscious avoidance" represents a new tool in the
prosection of corporate officials. In the conscious avoidance cases, the
government attempts to prove an individual's involvement in the
environmental crime where he deliberately closed his eyes to the
obvious."
A movement has developed toward criminal prosecution of
corporate executives for manslaughter and homicide in cases where
improper use of hazardous or toxic substances result in a death.'9 For
example, on August 28, 1991, prosecutors charged a New York
businessman with second degree manslaughter saying that the defendant
had paid for the illegal dumping of toxic wastes which killed another
man 20o
Finally, lawyers have become the targets of state criminal
prosecutions. In May 1991, the Solano County District Attorney's Office
16. Martin J. Moylan, Pollution Liability: Today's Coverage Is Under Control, but
Policies from Decades Past Are Returning to Haunt Many Insurers, MINNEAPOLIS-ST.
PAUL CrIYBUsINEss, Vol. 8, No. 31 at 11 (Jan. 14, 1991).
17. Whether an act is knowing may be inferred from the person's
conduct, from the person's familiarity with the subject... or from
all the facts and circumstances connected with the case. Knowledge
may also be established by evidence that the person took affirmative
steps to shield the person from relevant knowledge. Proof of
knowledge does not require that a person knew a particular act or
failure to act was a violation of law or that the person had specific
knowledge of the regulatory limits or testing procedures involved in a
case.
MINN. STAT. § 609.671(2)(a) (1991).
18. See United States v. Wong, 884 F.2d 1537 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Lanza,
790 F.2d 1015, 1023-24 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 861 (1986).
19. See New York v. Pymm, 563 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 958
(1991); Michigan v. Hegedus, 443 N.W.2d 127 (MI 1989), app. denied, 451 N.W.2d
861 (MI 1990); Illinois v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962, (Ill. 1989),
cert. denied by Astra v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 809 (Ill. 1989).
20. Manslaughter Charged in Waste Dumping Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1991 at
A6.
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charged a San Francisco attorney and his law firm with illegally disposing
of medical, radioactive, and hazardous wastes." The firm allegedly
advised a bankrupt client not to remove certain wastes left in a warehouse
from which the client had been evicted.22
III. TARGETS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
A. Corporations and their officials
In November 1990, Justice Department officials from DOJ's
Environment and Natural Resources Division stated that more corporate
officials were prosecuted in the fiscal year 1990 for environmental crimes
than at any time in the past.23 Attorney General Richard Thornburgh
noted that seventy-eight percent of the targets in fiscal 1990 were
corporations and their top officers and that "more than half of the
individuals convicted for environmental crimes [in 1990] were given prison
sentences and eighty-four percent of these were actually serving real jail
time. ' 2" Richard B. Stewart, then Assistant Attorney General in the
Environment and Natural Resources Division, noted that "most
prosecutions [were] against corporations and their top officers [averaging]
fine[s] over $181,000.25 In 1990, fifty-five percent of the individuals
indicted [were] given jail time with an average time served of 1.8 years.26
All these figures are unprecedented for environmental crimes." 27
Several cases illustrate the reality of these statements. In May
1990, in United States v. Tudor Jones, HJ,28 Paul Tudor Jones II, a
corporate officer, entered a guilty plea to Clean Water Act charges alleging
the filling of wetlands. He agreed to pay $2 million in fines and
21. Don J. DeBenedictis, Hazardous Advice, ABA J., Sept. 1991, at 16.
22. Id.
23. 1990 Record Year for Criminal Enforcement of Envt'l ,Violators, Justice
Announces, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 30 at 1397 (November 23, 1990).
24. 1 Nat'l Envtl. Watch (BNA) No. 33 (November 26, 1990).
25. 1990 Record Year for Criminal Enforcement of Envt'l Violators, Justice
Announces, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 30 at 1397 (November 23, 1990).
26. Id.
27. R.B. Stewart, Criminal Environmental Enforcement, (ALI-ABA April 11-12,
1991) at 3.
28. Toxic Turpitude: Charges of Environmental Crime Bring Business More Fines
and Prison Sentences, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1990, at Al.
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restitution and drew eighteen months probation.29 The fine was the
largest criminal wetlands disposition ever.3"
The increased exposure of corporate officials to environmental
criminal liability is further evident in the case of United States v.
McKiel.31 Robert and Scott McKiel, father and son, ran Astro Circuit
Corporation, as president and vice-president of operations respectively. 2
Beginning in 1986, city officials had notified Astro Circuit of high toxic
metals concentrations in its waste water, but the McKiels ignored the
warnings.3 In 1989, the younger McKiel was sentenced to three months
in prison and two years probation after pleading guilty to violating federal
water laws.3 The elder McKiel pleaded guilty to similar violations and
received four months in jail and two years probation.3
Most prosecutions are not of small midnight dumpers but of
established, legitimate businesses. In July 1991 the Aluminum Company
of America ("ALCOA") agreed to pay $7.5 million for violating New York
State environmental laws at its Massena facility, including $3.75 million
in criminal fines.36 An ALCOA environmental engineer and a former
environmental manager also entered guilty pleas.37
Similarly, International Paper Co., the largest paper mill in Maine,
entered a guilty plea on July 3, 1991 to five felony counts.38 Three of
the felony counts involved hazardous waste violations under RCRA.39
The fourth and fifth counts charged that the company had made false
material statements to federal and state environmental authorities regarding
hazardous waste and environmental practices at the paper mill.40 The
company agreed to pay a $2.2 million fine.4 ' The fine was the largest
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. No. 89-24-N (D.C. Mass. June 29, 1989) (cited in 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10 at
520 (July 7, 1989)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Environmental Policy Alert, July 24, 1991, at 23.
37. Id.
38. 16 Toxics L. Rep. No. 9 at 279 (July 31, 1991).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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ever assessed in Maine for environmental law violations and one of the
largest RCRA criminal fines.42
A survey of criminal defendants in environmental cases shows a
number of Fortune 500 and other prominent companies such as Ciba
Geigy, Exxon, Pennwalt and Union Carbide.43
B. Factors influencing criminal prosecution
Various factors play a role in criminal enforcement of
environmental statutes. Environmental harm or endangerment is one
significant factor. Other factors include the company's economic gain by
violating environmental regulations, a pattern of violations by the
company, a threat to the integrity of records or the regulatory system, and
the corporation's attitude concerning environmental compliance.
Recently, the DOJ elaborated on its efforts to encourage voluntary
compliance."4 Factors involved in prosecutorial decisions include the
voluntary disclosure of violations, cooperation with the government on
investigating violations, the use of environmental audits and other
procedures to ensure compliance with applicable environmental laws and
regulations, and the use of measures to remedy expeditiously and
completely violations.
45
In the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion, DOJ will consider
whether there was a voluntary, timely and complete disclosure of the
matter under investigation.46 A disclosure is not voluntary if a law,
42. See id.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Pennwalt Corp., No. CR88-55T (W.D. Wa. 1988)
(Tacoma plant manager and several top management officials charged with negligently
causing the discharge of pollutants.); State v. Ciba Geigy, 222 N.J.Super. 343, (App.
Div. 1988), cert. granted, 111 NJ. 574 (1988) (indictment against four middle
management officials of Ciba Geigy's Toms River plant in 1987 and a second
indictment charging twenty-four counts against Ciba Geigy and two officers of the
company including illegal disposal of hazardous waste, appeal later dismissed by
agreement among the parties).
44. U.S. Department of Justice, Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for
Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or
Disclosure Efforts by the Violator, July 1, 1991 [hereinafter "DOJ Statement"].
45. Id. at 3-4.
46. 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 45 at 2481 (March 6, 1992) (citing Federal Principles
of Prosecution (DOJ, 1980), Comment to Part A.2 (principles set forth as guidance not
as requirements); Part B.3 [hereinafter The Federal Principles]).
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regulation or permit required that disclosure.47 Rather, the disclosure
must occur before a law enforcement or regulatory authority has obtained
knowledge of the non-compliance.48 DOJ also takes into consideration
whether the person came forward promptly and the Department appraises
the quality and quantity of the information provided.49
Cooperation must be full, prompt and timely. 50 There will be an
inquiry into the existence and scope of any regularized, intensive, and
comprehensive environmental compliance program, which includes
environmental audits. 51 DOJ also emphasizes the need to ensure that a
compliance program includes sufficient measures to identify and prevent
non-compliance and to evaluate all sources of pollution.52
Additional factors which DOJ finds relevant include provision for
internal disciplinary action and effective compliance efforts with particular
emphasis on prompt, good faith efforts to reach environmental compliance
agreements with the government.53 Rarely will any one of these factors
be dispositive in any given case. DOJ considers and gives due weight to
all relevant factors. 4
In the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with regard to a corporate
official, federal and state prosecutors will consider a number of questions
including the following:
I. Was the official in a position to have known about the
condition or should he have known about it?
2. Was the official in a position to do something about the
condition?
47. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)-(5), as amended by the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701-61; 40 C.F.R. 110.6, 110.10; CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §
9603(a); 40 C.F.R. 302.6(a); Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11004.
48. See id.
49. DOJ Statement at 3-4.
50. 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 45 at 2481 (March 6, 1992).
51. DOJ Statement at 3-4.
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id. at 5-6.
54. Id. at 2. See also Federal Principles of Prosecution (U.S. Department of Justice,
1980), Comment to pt. A.2, pt B.3.
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3. Did the official consciously avoid or disregard doing
something about the condition?
4. Is there a connection between the condition and the conduct
of the official?
IV. THE GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
The number of statutes governing environmental matters has grown
considerably in the past decade. The following is an overview of some of
these laws as they relate to criminal enforcement. In some instances,
violations of these statutes may be quite technical in nature. Criminal
prosecutions frequently involve technical violations relating to reporting,
recordkeeping, sampling procedures, laboratory procedures, monitoring
methods and systems, labeling, retention time, and the handling of wastes.
On June 2, 1992, an environmental crimes bill (HR 5305) was
introduced in the House of Representatives that would toughen criminal
sanctions in a number of environmental laws. 55 Although still pending,
HR 5305 would amend the following laws to add tougher penalty
provisions: Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act, Ocean Dumping Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, Toxic Substances
Control Act, and Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act.5 6 Currently, only the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the
Resource Conservation Recovery Act carry the threat of jail time for
"knowing endangerment."
A. The Clean Air Act 7
The Clean Air Act represents Congress' latest effort in
environmental crimes legislation. Section 113(c) previously contained the
criminal enforcement provisions of the Clean Air Act which authorized the
EPA Administrator to bring an action for either a fine or confinement or
both, where the defendant knowingly violated specified sections of the
Clean Air Act.58 Under section 113(c)(1) courts may impose criminal
55. 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 27 at 1710 (Nov. 6, 1992).
56. 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8 at 670 (June 19, 1992).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642.
58. See Daniel Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and the Regulation of Hazardous
Substances, 21 Chemical Waste Litigation Rep., No. 6 at 964, 967 (May 1991).
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liability upon defendants for violating air pollution control requirements of
applicable state implementation plans, federal standards of performance for
new stationary sources,59 hazardous air pollutant standards, 60 certain
nonferrous smelter orders,6' or requirements relating to Section 120
noncompliance penalties.62 The criminal provision stated that the first
offense constituted a misdemeanor with subsequent offenses constituting
felonies and a doubling of fines and prison terms for repeat offenders.63
Section 113(c)(1) stated in pertinent part:
If the conviction is for a violation committed after the first
conviction of such person under this paragraph, punishment
shall be by a fine of not more than $50,000 per day of
violation, or by imprisonment for not more than two years,
or both.'
Criminal liability under section 113(c)(2) results from "knowingly"
making any false statement, representation, or certification in a document
filed or required to be maintained under the Act and for falsifying,
tampering with, or knowingly rendering inaccurate any monitoring device
or method.65
1. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
a. In general
Section 113(c) of the Clean Air Act, in both the pre-1990 and
amended version, imposed criminal liability on "any person" who
knowingly violated almost any of the statute's prohibitions or
requirements.6 The term "person" encompassed both individuals and
corporations, partnerships and business organizations. 67 Notwithstanding
that section 113(c) continued to apply broadly to "any person" after the
59. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1)(A).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1)(C).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1)(C).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1)(B),(D).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1).
64. Id.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2).
66. § 113(a)(1), (3), (c)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(a)(1), (3), (c)(1).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3).
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1990 amendments, the amendments increased the scope of the provisions
which would attract criminal penalties and enhanced the severity of those
penalties. 68 With one exception, 69 the law increased all of the violations
from misdemeanors to felonies, with corresponding increases in the
maximum fines and jail terms.
b. Violation of emission restrictions
Section 113(c)(1) states that any person who violates any
requirement or prohibition of an applicable air quality implementation plan
or virtually any substantive provision of the Act,7" is subject to a fine of
up to $250,000 or a prison term of up to five years, or both.7' An
organizational defendant is currently subject to a fine of up to $500,000.
c. False statements
Section 113(c)(2) provides that any person who knowingly makes
any false material statement or omission in, or fails to file or maintain any
document required under the Act, or who tampers with the monitoring
equipment, is subject to a fine of up to $250,000 or a prison term of up to
two years.72
d. Negligent endangerment
Perhaps the most important new provision added by the 1990
Amendments is section 113(c)(4) concerning negligent endangerment.
That provision imposes a fine of up to $100,000 and/or a prison term of
up to one year on any person who negligently releases any hazardous air
pollutant, or any "extremely hazardous substance" listed in the EPA
68. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1-5).
69. The exception is the penalty under § 113(c)(4) for negligent endangerment. See
infra p.12-13.
70. Criminal penalties could be triggered for knowing violations of the following:
implementation plans; section 113(a) orders; section 111(e) (New Source Performance
Standards); section 112 (hazardous emissions); section 129 (solid waste combustion);
section 114 (inspections); section 165(a) (preconstruction requirements); section 167
Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality ("PSD"); section 303
(emergency orders); sections 502(a) and 503(c) (permits); or, any provision relating to
acid deposition control or stratospheric ozone control.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2).
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regulations, and thereby negligently places another person in "imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury. 73
Although this provision is the only Clean Air Act criminal violation
that is a misdemeanor, the provision represents an extraordinary expansion
of criminal liability by imposing such liability on negligent acts and
omissions. While some limitation may be placed on its applicability
through the limiting phrase "imminent danger of death or substantial bodily
injury," the potential reach of this provision is enormous. The Act may
reach anyone with responsibility for ensuring environmental compliance.
Some commentators have criticized the negligent endangerment
provision of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments as being representative
of a trend that "see[s] our economic power base thoughtlessly eroded by
governmental policies in environmental and criminal law that are
needlessly hostile and punitive toward American industry. 74
e. Knowing endangerment
Another new criminal provision is section 113(c)(5) which imposes
a fine of up to $250,000 or a prison term of up to fifteen years, or both,
on any person who knowingly releases any hazardous air pollutant, or any
extremely hazardous substance, knowing that doing so places another
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.75 An
organization convicted under this provision may pay up to $1 million per
violation in fines. Second offenses are subject to twice the maximum fine
and imprisonment.76
The scope of section 113(c)(5) is limited, applying only to persons
with actual knowledge.77 In determining whether a defendant possessed
actual knowledge that his violation placed another person in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury, the amendments provide that the
defendant is responsible only for actual awareness or actual belief
possessed and that knowledge possessed by a person other than the
defendant cannot be attributed to the defendant.78  Circumstantial
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2).
74. George C. Freeman, Jr., Speech presented at the Clean Air Act Seminar in
Washington, D.C. 1 (January 23, 1991) (transcript available in law library of Hunton
& Williams, Richmond, Virginia.).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5).
76. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(B).
78. Id.
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evidence, however, can prove a defendant's possession of actual
knowledge.79
f. Failure to pay fees
A new section, 113(c)(3), makes the knowing failure to pay any fee
owed to the United States under the Act a misdemeanor.80 A knowing
failure to pay any fee owed to the United States under Title I, III, IV, or
V, therefore, is punishable by a fine of up to $250,000 or a prison term of
up to one year, or both.8 Organizations are now subject to a fine of up
to $500,000; and penalties double for repeat offenders.
g. Increased prosecutions against corporations and corporate
officers and employees under these provisions
Some prosecutions occurred even under the pre-amendment Clean
Air Act. In United States v. DAR Construction, Inc.,82 for example, a
corporation and its foreman were charged with asbestos-related violations.
The foreman received a sentence of ninety days in jail and three years
probation. 3 The corporation paid over $50,000 in fines. Similarly in
United States v. Import Certification Laboratories, Inc.,85 a company's
president and employees were convicted of filing false reports. The
Department of Justice and EPA have predicted that criminal prosecutions
will increase further under the 1990 amendments.86
B. The Clean Water Act
1. Original Clean Water Act criminal provisions
The criminal provisions of the original Clean Water Act were
contained in section 309(c)Y Section 309(c)(1) of the Clean Water Act
provided misdemeanor penalties of up to one year of imprisonment and a
79. Id.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3).
81. Id.
82. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1 at 21 (May 5, 1989).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 37 at 1993 (Jan. 8, 1988).
86. More Prosecutions Under New Air Bill Predicted by Justice Department, EPA, 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9 at 421 (June 29, 1990).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
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$25,000 fine for "willful" or "negligent" violation of effluent limitations
prescribed by the Act, or of conditions or limitations in National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits issued by the
Administrator or a state in a section 404 permit.88 The same act became
felonious where committed "after a first conviction."89
Section 309(c)(2) of the original Clean Water Act established
misdemeanor penalties of up to six months imprisonment and a $10,000
fine for knowing falsification of records and for tampering with monitoring
devices "required to be maintained" under the Act?
2. Water Quality Act of 19879'
In the Water Quality Act of 1987, Congress added new breadth to
the scope of criminal liability. The penalties for a negligent violation of
effluent limitations or violations of conditions or limitations in permits
remained the same under the terms of an amended section 309(c)(1). 92
An amended section 309(c)(2) elevated to felony status the knowing
violation of permits or standards.93 In addition, the knowing violation
section provides criminal penalties for introducing into any publicly owned
treatment works ("POTW") any pollutant or hazardous substance which the
discharger knew or reasonably should have known could cause personal
injury or possible damage or which would cause a POTW to violate its
permit limits.'
88. Section 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1); section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).
90. Section 309(c)(2), Federal Water Pollution Control Act (1948).
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1245a-1414a.
92. (1) Negligent violations. Any person who (A) negligently violates
section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 ... or (B)
negligently introduces into a sewer system or into a publicly owned
treatment works.., shall be punished by a fine of not less than
$2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both ....
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).
93. Section 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2).
94. (2) Knowing violations. Any person who (A) knowingly violates
section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title ...
or (B) knowingly introduces into a sewer system or into a publicly
owned treatment works any pollutant or hazardous substance which
such person knew or reasonably should have known could cause
personal injury or property damage... shall be punished by a fine
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The Act also provided for the crime of "knowing endangerment"
under section 312(c)(3). 95 That provision provided in pertinent part:
Any person who knowingly violates section 1311, 1312,
1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title ... and who
knows at the time that he thereby places another person in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, shall
upon conviction be subject to a fine of not more than
$250,000 or imprisonment for not more than 15 years or
both .... 96
The enactment of a knowing endangerment provision is
symptomatic of the changes affecting environmental crime statutes. The
crime involves a knowing violation of an applicable permit, statute, rule
or regulation by a person "who knows at that time that he thereby places
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. '
The language is similar to that contained in section 3008(e) of RCRA. 98
The holding in United States v. Borowski99illustrated the reality of
convictions under this provision. In Borowski, company officers had
directed employees to pour certain chemicals into a sewer. 1°° The owner
was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison. 1' As reported in
the Wall Street Journal:
When he first dumped acid says former employee Jerry
Kocjan, '... . I saw my hands were turning yellow from the
acid vapors. When I showed them to Borowski, he just
showed me his hands. They were yellow too.' Indeed, Mr.
Borowski never seemed to realize how toxic Borjohn's
chemicals were, agree former employees. Once he put his
of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation,
or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by both ....
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2).
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3).
96. Id.
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e).
99. 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27 at 770 (May 3,1990).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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daughter's old bicycle in a vat of the company's acid
overnight to clean it up, they said. The bike partly
dissolved and fell apart.
10 2
Section 312(c)(4) of the Water Quality Act also contains felony
sanctions for anyone "who knowingly makes any false material statement
in any application, record, report, plan, or other document filed or required
to be maintained under this Act."'0 3 Penalties are a $10,000 fine or up
to two years imprisonment, or both."
C. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
1. Section 3008(d) criminal provisions
RCRA prohibits certain treatment, storage, disposal or
transportation of hazardous waste and provides criminal sanctions for
violations in section 3008(d).0 5  Section 3008(d)(1-2), as recently
amended, provides for felony penalties of up to five years imprisonment
and fines up to $50,000 per day for knowingly transporting hazardous
waste to an unpermitted facility or for knowingly disposing of hazardous
waste without a permit.' °6
Section 3008(d)(3) provides penalties of up to two years
imprisonment and fines of up to $50,000 a day against any person who
"knowingly omits material information or makes any false material
statement" regarding records.'0 7 Similar penalties are imposed under
section 3008(d)(4) for the knowing destruction or alteration of certain
RCRA records. Any person who "knowingly generates, stores, treats,
transports, disposes of, exports, or otherwise handles [such hazardous
waste] . . . and who knowingly destroys, alters, conceals, or fails to file
any record, application, manifest, report or other document required to be
maintained or filed" may be liable under the Act.0 8
102. David Stipp, Toxic Turpitude: Environmental Crime Can Land Executives in
Prison These Days, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1990, at Al.
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4).
104. Id.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1-2). Previously the penalties for Section 3008(d)(1-2) had
been up to two years of imprisonment and fines of up to $50,000 per day of the
violation. Section 6928(d) was amended in 1984.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(4).
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A number of cases demonstrate the vigorous prosecution and stiff
penalties under section 3008(d). A subsequent section of this paper,
discussing the erosion of the criminal intent element in environmental
criminal prosecution, contains a more complete discussion of such
cases. 10
9
2. Section 3008(e): "knowing endangerment"
The 1980 amendment to RCRA, as further amended by the 1984
Hazardous and Solid Waste Act, led to the creation of the section 3008(e)
which provides:
Any person who knowingly transports, treats, stores,
disposes of, or exports any hazardous waste.., in violation
of paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (7) of subsection
(d) of this section who knows at the time that he thereby
places another person in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury, shall upon conviction be subject to a
fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for not
more than 15 years, or both. . ... 0
The "special rules" of section 3008(f) define "knowing" as the term
is used in section 3008(e)."' A subsequent section of this paper will
discuss how the courts have interpreted this intent element.1 2  The
effectiveness of the "knowing endangerment" offense as a serious
prosecutorial tool against corporate violators cannot be doubted after
United States v. Protex Industries.' 3 The corporation was convicted of
knowingly endangering three employees who worked in the company's
drum recycling facility and were exposed to hazardous substances.114
Initially, the corporation was fined $7.63 million.'1 5 All but $440,000
of the fine was ultimately suspended, however, on the condition that the
109. See infra pp. 23-37 and accompanying notes.
110. Organizational defendants could incur fines of up to $ 1 million. 42 U.S.C. §
6928(e).
111. Id. at § 6928(0.
112. See infra Part V at pp. 24 - 38.
113. 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989).
114. Id. at 742.
115. 30 Air Water Pollution Rep. (BNA) No. 36 (September 14, 1992).
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company pay almost $1 million restitution and $2.1 million in cleanup
costs.
D. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability Act
Congress added to the list of environmental crimes by enacting the
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA") which
increased the penalties for criminal activities under CERCLA. 116
CERCLA, as amended by SARA, provides for the imposition of criminal
fines in accordance with the Uniform Criminal Code and imprisonment up
to five years for certain recordkeeping and reporting violations." 7 The
knowing mutilation of records now constitutes a felony and the filing of
false CERCLA claims is now a criminal violation."'
E. The Occupational Safety and Health Act (the OSH Act)" 9 Criminal
Penalty Reform
The OSH Act has available only weak criminal penalties. 20 The
history of criminal prosecutions under the OSH Act appears quite limited.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health estimates that
7,000 deaths occur in the work place yearly.12' Statistics from such
organizations as the AFL-CIO put the number of work place fatalities at
more than 20,000 per year. 2  However, from 1971 through 1991, the
OSH Administration referred only eighty cases to DOJ for possible
criminal action. Fewer than one-third of these cases have been
prosecuted.'23
F. The Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA")'12
116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
117. See CERCLA section 103(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(d)(2) (falsifying and
destruction of records required to be kept pursuant to EPA regulations); SARA, section
325 (offense of falsifying or refusing emergency information under Emergency
Planning & Community Right to Know Act 1986); CERCLA section 112(b)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 9612(b)(1) and 2(b)(7) (punishment of false claims knowingly submitted for
reimbursement from the fund).
118. Id.
119. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78.
120. See id.
121. 225 Daily Labor Rep't C-I, Nov. 21, 1990 (BNA-LB).
122. Id.
123. 164 Daily Labor Rep't A-I, August 23, 1991 (BNA-LB).
124. 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y.
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FIFRA regulates registration, branding and other aspects of
insecticides and similar substances.' 25  Section 14(b) of FIFRA
establishes criminal penalties for knowing violation of any provision of the
Act.126 Although FIFRA penalties are more limited than those in other
statutes, Congress has provided for criminal liability to be imposed
vicariously upon principals without any additional required mental state,
for the acts, omissions, or failures of officers, agents or employees. 127
In United States v. Corbin Farm Service121 the court held that persons
"using" a pesticide included persons who advised the applicator in its
selection and application.'29
G. The Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA") 30
Like FIFRA, TSCA is a statutory scheme for the regulation of
certain toxic substances. Its criminal enforcement provision applies to
violations of section 2614 and carries misdemeanor penalties .13  The
penalties include fines of up to $25,000 per day and/or up to one year
imprisonment.
132
H. Other federal statutes
The government has been bold and creative in its use of other,
somewhat obscure statutes. For example, in the case of the Exxon Valdez
spill, the government included charges based on the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act 33 for the killing of migratory birds without a permit.34
I. General Criminal Statutes
125. Id.
126. 7 U.S.C. § 1361(1)(b).
127. Id.
128. 444 F. Supp. 510, (E.D. Cal. 1978), affd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
129. Id. at 523.
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-71.
131. 7 U.S.C. § 2614, proscribes the failure to comply with notice and handling
restrictions, the use of substances processed negligently in violation of these
restrictions, the failure to maintain proper records, and the refusal to allow regulatory
inspections. TSCA section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b).
132. Id.
133. 16 U.S.C. § 707(a).
134. United States v. Exxon, No. A90-015 (D. Ark. filed Feb. 27, 1990).
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As federal enforcement efforts become more aggressive, prosecutors
are using general criminal provisions in order to seek stiffer criminal
penalties.
Typical of this trend has been the Department of Justice's use of
conspiracy charges in addition to violations of federal environmental laws.
In 1990, a defunct Pennsylvania drum recycling company, Metro Container
Corp., its affiliate Metro-Enterprise Container Corp., the president and
owner, Sidney S. Levy, and a company maintenance supervisor were
charged with criminal violations of RCRA and the CWA as well as
conspiracy to violate those statutes. 35 That same year, EKOTEK, a
hazardous waste management company in Utah, and its president were
indicted on twelve counts of conspiracy to violate the Clean Air Act,
CWA, and RCRA. 136  In addition, EKOTEK was charged with mail
fraud for allegedly misrepresenting to customers through the mail that it
would properly and legally dispose of hazardous wastes. 13
Other Title 18 general criminal provisions which have been
employed in environmental cases include false statements, 38 mail and
wire fraud,139 and aiding and abetting. 40
135. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 17 at 824 (August 24, 1990). Levy and his
maintenance supervisor pleaded guilty to the conspiracy and hazardous waste dumping
charges. Guilty pleas on the conspiracy charges were also entered on behalf of Metro
Container Corp. and its affiliate. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Firm's Owner Guilty in
Dumping Case, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, October 30, 1991, at BI.
136. 21 Env't Rep. No. 9 at 423 (BNA) (June 29, 1990). EKOTEK is one of
Disneyland's contractors. After EKOTEK's improper disposal of thousands of gallons
of hazardous waste from Disneyland, Walt Disney Company agreed to pay a $550,000
federal fine. A Mickey Mouse Way to Handle Toxic Waste, SEATrLE TIMEs, July 21,
1990, at A6.
137. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9 at 423 (June 29, 1990).
138. The false statements offense which consists of knowingly and willfully
falsifying, concealing or covering up a material fact or making any false fictitious or
fraudulent statements attracts fines of up to $10,000 and/or prison terms up to five
years. 18 U.S.C. § 1001. In United States v. Rudd the government alleged that the
supplier of laboratory items falsified control data submitted to the EPA. No. 90-0630
(N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 30, 1990). See also United States v. YWC Inc., No. B90-64-
WWE (D. Conn. filed Dec. 5, 1990) (regarding false reports sent to EPA concerning
CERCLA test results).
139. Mail and wire fraud consist of any attempt to defraud any person by sending
material through the United States mail, or by wire, radio, or television. In United
States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336-38 (N.D. Ill. 1979) false representations made to the
EPA regarding FIFRA compliance using instrumentalities of interstate commerce
resulted in wire fraud prosecution.
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J. Federal Sentencing Guidelines: enhancement of environmental
crime penalties
As a result of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984'14 and the
promulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 those convicted of
environmental crimes will receive harsh treatment. The purpose of the
Sentencing Guidelines was to create a set of mandatory guidelines which
would treat various classes of offenders consistently.143 The Guidelines
contain a mandatory range of determinate sentences for each level of
federal offense and a court may depart from the Guideline range only if
it finds a mitigating or aggravating factor which the Sentencing
Commission did not adequately consider.'" A statement of reasons must
support any such departure. 45 In drafting the guidelines the Sentencing
Commission felt that penalties imposed on environmental defendants in the
past were too low when compared to those given other white collar
criminals.' 46 The Commission singled out environmental offenses as
being "particularly important in light of the need for enforcement of the
general regulatory scheme.'0
47
The Sentencing Guidelines abolished parole for environmental.
crimes defendants in order "to ensure that the sentence imposed ... is the
sentence the offender will serve."' 4' The Guidelines severely restrict the
use of probation, an outcome which had been the norm in environmental
crime cases. Individuals convicted of environmental offenses are spending
more time in jail. 49  A typical case is United States v. Pozsgai'50 in
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 2; United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
141. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98.
142. The original Sentencing Guidelines applied only to individuals. The
organizational guidelines were approved by the Sentencing Commission on April 26,
1991 and became effective in 1991. The sentencing of organizations is covered in
Chapter Eight of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. App. 4. With specific
regard to the sentencing of organizations, "[i]f the offense presented a threat to the
environment, an upward departure may be warranted." 18 U.S.C. App. 4 § 84C4.4.
143. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Ch. 1, pt. A, 18 U.S.C. App. 4.
144. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
145. United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1990).
146. United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual,
ch. 1, pt. A, p. 8 (1991).
147. Id.
148. Starr & Kelly, Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing Guidelines: The Time
Has Come ... and It Is Hard Time, 20 Envt'l. L. Rep. 10096, 10100 (March 1990).
149. Id.
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which the owner of a truck repair business was sentenced to twenty-seven
months in prison for adding topsoil to his property when his property had
been classified as wetland and the addition of soil was a violation of the
Clean Water Act.151
V. EROSIONS OF CRIMINAL INTENT
A. Environmental crimes as regulatory crimes
Most environmental crimes defendants, whether corporate or
individual, are shocked upon learning how easily the government can
establish criminal liability. In large measure, such ease can be traced to
the erosion of the element of criminal intent or mens rea.
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only
when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient
notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems
of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil.
15 2
[T]he cumulative effects of pollution are more dangerous
and their repercussions more long-lasting and profound than
any crime yet faced by a judicial system .... If ever there
existed a situation which mandated the compromise of
defendants' individual rights to achieve a greater good, this
is it .... Pollution must be stopped. The corporate forum
in which most environmental crimes occur prevents the
effective use of the traditional criminal law. Strict liability
150. No. CR-88-00450 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1989), affd, 897 F.2d 524 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 48 (1990).
151. For cases illustrating jail time for environmental criminal defendants in the wake
of the Sentencing Guidelines, see United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.
1991); United States v. Wells, 922 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1991).
152. Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
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standards for convictions of corporate officers would
provide the desired deterrent effect."5 3
Traditional limits of the criminal law insisted that no criminal
penalty can exist without personal blame, and that no basis for blame
exists without a wrongful intent. This idea is expressed in the maxim, "An
act does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty."' 54 The maxim
is still valid in most contexts. Theft cannot be committed without an
intent to steal. Fraud cannot be committed without an intent to cheat.
Yet, for two generations or longer, another idea has stood in opposition to
this old maxim, at least in the field of regulatory legislation. As the
Supreme Court noted in 1943,
Such legislation dispenses with the conventional
requirement for criminal conduct -- awareness of some
wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent
but standing in responsible relation to a public good.'55
The principle is well entrenched now that legislatures may dispense
with any requirement of criminal intent when creating regulatory
offenses.'56 When the legislature has done so, the courts do not need to
manufacture such a requirement on their own to make up for the statute's
deficiency. Further, the courts have developed principles imposing
vicarious criminal liability within business entities, without requiring proof
of individual wrongdoing, at least when the offense is one of strict
liability.
Environmental crimes are subject to these general principles of
regulatory crime. Some commentators contend that the federal courts have
gone further than Congress in expanding the intent requirement for
environmental crimes.5 7 The argument concludes that in substance, if
not in words, the courts are evading statutory intent elements and holding
153. Robert A. Milne, The Mens Rea Requirements of the Federal Environmental
Statutes: Strict Criminal Liability in Substance But Not Form, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 387,
333-34 (1989).
154. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 27, at 192 (1972).
155. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943).
156. See, e.g., CERCLA section 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
]157. Milne, supra note 153 at 309.
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corporate employees and officers strictly liable under environmental
statutes that, on their face, require proof of intent.'58 The courts are
sustaining convictions, fines, and even imprisonment, when the "criminals"
are guilty of no criminal intent at all.' 9 One author lauds this result:
The strict liability formulation relieves prosecutors of the
burdensome requirement of showing that a corporate officer
had actual knowledge of an environmental violation,
previously the major stumbling block in this type of case.
Prosecutors have thus been afforded an ideal opportunity to
secure, on a regular basis, convictions of corporate officers
for environmental crimes -- an opportunity which should be
exploited to the fullest.' 6
Such commentators no doubt exaggerate the current trend, but
corporate managers can ill afford to ignore the basic message. Some
environmental statutes, notably, the Refuse Act of 1899,16' do impose
strict liability. In addition, general doctrines of the criminal responsibility
of corporate managers put such managers at risk, despite their good faith
efforts to solve environmental problems of which they become aware.'62
In many instances, good faith clearly may not be enough. Some
conclusions follow.
First, corporate managers (and owners and directors) are at risk of
criminal prosecution as never before, despite a lack of intent to violate the
law.
Second, compliance, as nearly complete as possible, is more
important than ever. Ignorance will not provide a reliable defense in a
subsequent criminal prosecution for environmental violations. A thorough
environmental audit is often a necessary first step to securing compliance.
Deliberate ignorance or "willful blindness" will provide no defense, even
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 332.
161. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (1899)
(current version at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988)) [commonly referred to as The Refuse Act].
162. See United States v. Mexico Fee and Seed Col, Inc., 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir.
1992) (stating that "CERCLA is a remedial strict liability statute and its focus is on
responsibility, not culpability.").
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
when a criminal statute requires proof of the defendant's knowledge." 3
Taking additional steps can establish, before the fact, a purpose to obey the
law, not violate it. An effective preventive program will document what
has been done to obtain compliance. In this way, one can make a record
to negate any criminal intent, which in some form, even if a diminished
one, still does exist as a necessary element for many or most
environmental crimes. Prevention, even if not infallible, still can go far
toward minimizing the risk.
Third, if a criminal prosecution nonetheless begins or is threatened,
or if prosecution has begun before a preventive program can be
implemented, defendants must utilize the intent elements of the statutes.
These requirements may well hold the keys to a successful defense.
Despite deep and broad public concern over the environment, juries resist
convicting individuals unfairly. When a jury receives proper instructions,
and when it hears sufficiently compelling evidence of a defendant's lack
of wrongful intent or knowledge, a defendant can win an acquittal.
Defense counsel, in the legal and factual preparation and presentation of
the case, must press vigorously the point that the defendant never harbored
a criminal intent, and that it is unfair and contrary to statute to punish as
criminals those who never intended to do any wrong.
The traditional principle that there is no crime without a criminal
mind has eroded. So-called regulatory crimes may impose strict liability.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Park 
16
imposed criminal liability in the absence of any clearly discernible
wrongdoing, and certainly without proof of any purposeful violation of the
law. Businesses subject to environmental regulation and those who operate
them cannot afford to ignore the inherent risks. More than ever before,
scrupulous if not perfect compliance is the only completely safe course.
At the same time, the criminal provisions of environmental laws are
varied and complex, and many may ameliorate the harshness of strict
liability. An environmental compliance program should conscientiously
document efforts made to obtain compliance, to provide notice of potential
problems, and to address and remedy problems as they arise. If criminal
prosecutions begin or are threatened, a business should make every effort
to establish a lack of intention to violate the law. Defendants must study
the particular statutes for opportunities to defend on grounds of a lack of
163. See, e.g., United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 956 (1980).
164. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
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criminal intention. The absence of criminal intention should be
emphasized at all stages: in dealings with the government to stave off
criminal prosecution; in efforts to avoid indictment; in pre-trial motions
and instruction requests; before the jury at trial; and, if necessary, on
appeal.
Sensitivity to these issues may be critical. For example, in United
States v. Greer,165 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed a conviction under RCRA and a related offense, reversing
the trial judge's grant of a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal.
The only mental elements in the judge's instructions were knowledge of
the disposal of chemical waste, and knowledge "that the chemical waste
had the potential to be harmful to others or to the environment, and that
it was not an innocuous substance like water."' 66 The judge never told
the jury that it had to find that Greer was aware of either the need for a
permit or the absence of one; yet, at least on appeal, the defense did not
challenge these jury instructions.167 Until the Supreme Court definitively
establishes mental elements necessary for a RCRA conviction, there is
little to be lost, and perhaps much to be gained, by pressing the issue.
Despite the courts' acceptance of regulatory offenses, and the
legislatures' willingness to enact crimes that dispense with proof of
criminal intent, the idea that a crime requires a criminal mind is deeply
ingrained. 68  A defendant still can ask juries to see, and act on, the
unfairness of convicting a person who had no awareness that what he was
doing was wrong or illegal. Defense attorneys should exploit all
opportunities that the relevant statute may provide, so that a lack of
criminal intent can form the basis for a successful defense.
B. Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
To sketch out the general nature of the problem of defining the
mental state necessary for conviction of environmental crime, this section
discusses some important decisions.
Park was not an environmental case, but a prosecution for strict
liability offenses under the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.169 The
165. 850 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1988).
166. Id. at 1450.
167. Id. at 1450 n.7.
168. See, e.g., 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 4 (1880) ("Even a dog
distinguishes between being tripped over and being kicked.").
169. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(k), 342(a)(3), 342(a)(4) (1988).
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case establishes a far-reaching principle of criminal liability for corporate
officers or employees who stand in a responsible relationship to activities
of the corporation that violate the federal criminal laws, at least when
those laws create strict liability crimes.
Park was president and chief executive officer of Acme Markets,
Inc., a national food chain with headquarters in Philadelphia.1 70 Rodents
had infested an Acme warehouse in Baltimore, Maryland and Park was
warned of the problem. 1 1  He conferred with the corporation's vice
president for legal affairs, and learned that the responsible Baltimore
division vice president "was investigating the situation immediately and
would be preparing a summary of the corrective action in reply to the
[FDA's warning] letter. ' 172 In his testimony, Park conceded that his
position in the company made him ultimately responsible for "any result
which occurs in our company," although he did not "believe there was
anything [he] could have done more constructively than what [he] found
was being done," to combat the rats in Acme's Baltimore warehouse.17
3
The trial court instructed the jury that
[Park] is or could be liable under the statute, even if he did
not consciously do wrong .... The issue is, in this case,
whether the Defendant, John R. Park, by virtue of his
position in the company, had a position of authority and
responsibility in the situation out of which these charges
arose. 174
Park was convicted on five misdemeanor counts, and the Supreme
Court sustained the conviction.1 75 The government's case was sufficient,
the Court said,
to warrant a finding... that the defendant had, by reason
of his position in the corporation, responsibility and
authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly
170. Park, 421 U.S. at 660.
171. Id. at 662.
172. Id. at 664.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 665 n.9.
175. Id. at 667.
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to correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to
do so.
176
The Supreme Court held the trial court's instructions to be adequate to
focus the jury's attention "on the issue of respondent's authority with
respect to the conditions that formed the basis of the alleged
violations. '177
The Park decision can be criticized on a number of grounds.
Probably the most significant aspect of its holding is that "responsibility"
for preventing or correcting a problem, by itself, provides a basis for
conviction.17 ' A defendant may hold this "responsibility" even if "he did
not consciously do wrong;" presumably, a defendant may hold
"responsibility," though unaware of the problem itself.179 As a rule of
liability within a corporate structure, this holding offers few refuges for
corporate officers and managers against the risk of criminal prosecution
when a problem within their general domain triggers a criminal strict
liability provision.
In United States v. Johnson & Towers,80 Hopkins and Angel, two
employees of the corporation, were alleged to have managed and directed
its operations involving the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous
wastes and pollutants. They were charged individually with violating a
RCRA provision, which makes liable
Any person who...
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous
waste identified or listed under this subchapter either
176. Id. at 673-74.
177. Justice Stewart, for three dissenters, protested that Park had been convicted under
an instruction on Park's "responsibility" that
had whatever meaning the jury in its unguided discretion chose to
give it. The instructions, therefore, expressed nothing more than a
tautology. They told the jury: 'You must find the defendant guilty if
you find that he is to be held accountable for this adulterated food.'
In other words: 'You must find the defendant guilty if you conclude
that he is guilty.'
Id. at 679 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 674.
179. Id. at 666 n.9.
180. 741 F.2d 662, 664 (3d Cir. 1984).
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(A) without having obtained a permit under 6925 of
this title ... or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition
or requirement of such permit.'
The District Court had dismissed these counts against defendants,
on the ground that RCRA criminal provisions reached only "owners and
operators," and that Hopkins and Angel, as employees, therefore could not
be prosecuted. 8 2 On appeal, the Third Circuit opined that "[t]he single
issue in this appeal is whether the individual defendants are subject to
prosecution" under RCRA; 18 3 and, the court held that they were'
84
Despite the court's statement of "the single issue" before it, the
court went on to consider another issue as well, the meaning of
"knowingly" in section 6928(d).8 5 Specifically, did the prosecution need
to prove that defendants knew that there was no permit under section 6925
of RCRA? 186  Or did the prosecutor's proof of the defendants'
knowledge need to extend only to the fact that hazardous waste was being
treated, stored, or disposed?"' 7 The question is obviously critical to the
issue of guilty knowledge, for it is the lack of a permit that makes
otherwise legal conduct unlawful and subject to criminal prosecution. 88
Under the government's theory, an employee could treat, store, or dispose
of hazardous substances in the erroneous belief that the company held a
permit, yet be guilty of a crime if this belief proved to be wrong.18 9 The
court rejected the government's theory and, as a matter of statutory
construction, held that knowledge of the absence of a permit was an
element of the crime, to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt like every
other element."g
The court next held that "the government need prove only
knowledge of the actions taken and not of the statute forbidding
181. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2).
182. 741 F.2d at 664.
183. Id. at 665.
184. Id. at 667.
185. Id. at 667-70.
186. Id. at 669.
187. Id. at 668.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 667.
190. Id. at 669.
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them."'91  Despite this statement, the court, inconsistently, said that to
convict, "the jury must find that each knew that Johnson & Towers was
required to have a permit, and knew that Johnson & Towers did not have
a permit."192 Further, the court offered some thoughts about how the
prosecution might meet its burden of proving the defendant's
knowledge. 93 The court could instruct the jury "that such knowledge,
including that of the permit requirement, may be inferred by the jury as to
those individuals who hold the requisite responsible positions with the
corporate defendant."''
This last statement from the Johnson & Towers opinion has drawn
substantial attention. It has been read as in effect imposing strict liability
upon "those individuals who hold the requisite responsible positions,"' 95
but this is a misreading of the court's opinion. The court meant to say
only that here, as elsewhere in the criminal law where the prosecutor must
prove that the defendant acted with certain knowledge, that knowledge
does not necessarily need to be proved directly, by words spoken from the
defendant's mouth, or written by the defendant's hand. Knowledge may
be proved indirectly, or inferred, from all of the surrounding
circumstances, including the defendant's conduct, so long as the jury is
instructed that it is free to accept or reject the inference from
circumstantial evidence, and that the prosecutor still must prove the
191. Id. This holding simply follows settled principles. The maxim that "ignorance
of the law is no defense" covers most criminal offenses. The maxim may not apply
with full force, however, for certain regulatory or similar offenses. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that conviction for a "willful" violation of the tax laws
requires proof that the defendant intentionally violated a known legal duty. Cheek v.
United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991). See also, Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419 (1985) (offense of "knowingly" misusing food stamps requires proof that
defendant "knew that he was acting in a manner not authorized by statute or
regulations"). When, however, the defendant's conduct poses obvious risks to the
public, or involves dangerous instrumentalities or the like, the prosecution ordinarily
need not prove any knowledge by the defendant that his or her conduct violated the
law. The inherent danger of the conduct puts the defendant on notice of the likelihood
that the conduct is regulated, and such a person can remain ignorant of those
regulations only at his or her peril. United States v. International Minerals & Chem.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) (regarding transportation of corrosive liquids). This
reasoning has been applied to environmental crimes. E.g., United States v. Dee, 912
F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991).
192. 741 F.2d at 669.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Milne, supra note 153.
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requisite guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.19, The
surrounding circumstances also include the defendant's position in the
corporation.
This reasoning represents common sense. If the defendant's job
responsibilities naturally would have made him aware both of
environmental permit requirements and of the organization's compliance,
then the jury might conclude that the defendant was in fact so aware.
Nothing in the opinion of Johnson & Towers says that the defendant's
"responsible position" in an organization may substitute for proof of actual
knowledge; rather, the "responsible position" may constitute an element of
such proof.'9 The court left Hopkins and Angel free to attack such
proof, by their own testimony or other means, to persuade the jury that in
fact they did not act with the requisite knowledge, despite holding
"responsible positions." '198
The First Circuit, in United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste
Oil Co., 99 reversed convictions under RCRA because the trial court's
instructions on the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine confused these
two notions. Instead of treating the defendant's status within a corporation
as circumstantial evidence from which the jury might infer his actual
knowledge, the trial court told the jury that evidence of the defendant's
status could substitute for proof of actual knowledge. 2°  Such an
instruction constituted error, the First Circuit said, because it improperly
196. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has attempted to draw a line between
impermissible "presumptions" and permissible "inferences." See generally Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985). In general, a rational "permissive inference" is
constitutional, so long as the jury is clearly informed that it is free to accept or reject
the "inference," and that, with or without use of an inference, it must find the
defendant not guilty unless all of the elements of the offense have been proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 314.
197. 741 F.2d 662, 669-70 (1984).
198. In United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991), the court
refused to apply a "responsible corporate officer" doctrine that, the prosecutor argued,
derived from Johnson & Tower and relieved the piosecution of the need to prove that
the defendants had "knowingly treat[ed], store[d] or dispose[d] of any hazardous
waste." The court concluded that "[n]one of the cases cited by the government
supports the theory that a conviction may be had under a state of mind requirement
other than that specified by Congress." 766 F. Supp. 873, 895 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
199. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
200. Id. at 52.
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transplanted a doctrine that applies under Park and other cases in the strict
liability field to an offense that requires proof of actual knowledge. 2 1
RCRA's criminal provisions, as construed in Johnson & Towers,
still provide ample opportunity for a defense based on the defendant's lack
of criminal knowledge or intent. Yet subsequent case law has contradicted
the Third Circuit's interpretation of RCRA as requiring proof of knowledge
of the lack of a permit, and of the requirement for one, in a prosecution
under section 6928(d)(2)(A).
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Hayes International
Corp.,202 reached the same conclusion as in Johnson & Towers, that a
RCRA prosecution under section 6298(d)(2)(A) requires proof of
knowledge of the lack of a permit. In the same decision, however, the
court disagreed that knowledge of the need for a permit was an element
of the offense.20 3
In its 1989 decision in United States v. Hoflin,2° the Ninth
Circuit went further in excising the element of intent. The court expressly
disagreed with Johnson & Towers and held that "knowledge of the absence
of a permit is not an element of the offense defined by 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(d)(2)(A)., 20 5  The court also apparently dispensed with any
requirement of proof that the defendant knew that a permit was
required.2' The only intent requirement that the court recognized was
the requirement that the prosecutor prove "that the defendant knew the
material being disposed of was hazardous. 20 7
The First and Fifth Circuits have addressed the same issues.
Neither has gone as far as did the Third Circuit in Johnson & Towers to
find criminal intent elements under RCRA, but the cases show that
opportunities still exist for litigating the intent required for conviction. Yet
the District Court for the Northern District of New York recently rejected
both Johnson & Towers and Hoflin and held, on the government's motion
in limine that the only knowledge that needs to be proved under
section 6928(d)(2)(A) is the knowledge of disposal of a substance with
potential for harm.20 8
201. Id. at 55.
202. 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
203. Id. at 1503-04.
204. 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
205. 880 F.2d at 1038.
206. Id. at 1039.
207. Id.
208. United States v. Laughlin, 768 F. Supp. 957, 960 (N.D. N.Y. 1991).
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In United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,'m the
First Circuit addressed the necessary intent in a RCRA prosecution under
section 6928(d)(1), which prohibits the transportation of hazardous waste
to an unpermitted facility, if done "knowingly." In MacDonald & Watson
Waste Oil the court approved, in dicta, a trial court's instruction that the
prosecution must prove that the defendant knew that the facility lacked a
proper permit, or "willfully failed to determine" whether it had the
necessary permit." The First Circuit said that there was "much to be
said" for requiring proof of such knowledge; but the court also stressed
that the issue was not presented on appeal.2
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 212
concluded in a prosecution under section 6928(d)(2)(A) that Congress' use
of the term "knowingly"
means no more than that the defendant knows factually
what he is doing -- storing, what is being stored, and that
what is being stored factually has the potential for harm to
others or the environment, and that he has no permit -- and
it is not required that he know that there is a regulation
which says what he is storing is hazardous under the
RCRA.213
On this last point, the Fifth Circuit expressly disagreed with Johnson &
Towers, but in requiring proof of the defendant's knowledge "that he has
no permit," the Baytank court also disagreed with the Ninth Circuit in
Hoflin.214
The Northern District of New York court faced similar issues in
United States v. Laughlin.2 5 The court found neither Johnson & Towers
nor Hoflin persuasive and held "that the government is not required to
prove that defendants in this case knew that a permit was required by law
nor that they knew that [the company] did not have a permit in order to
prove that defendants violated section 6928(d)(2)(A)., 216
209. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
210. Id. at 47.
211. Id. at 47.
212. 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991).
213. Id. at 613.
214. Id. at 613.
215. 768 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. N.Y. 1991).
216. Id. at 966.
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Not only have the expansive intent requirements for the various
elements of RCRA criminal prosecutions as promulgated by the Johnson
& Tower decision been cut back, but some courts also have accepted the
responsible corporate officer doctrine which the government pressed
unsuccessfully so often in cases such as MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil
Co. 21 7 and United States v. White.218  In United States v. Brittain,21 9
the court convicted defendant-appellant Brittain, a sewage treatment plant
supervisor, of eighteen felony counts of falsely reporting a material fact to
a government agency22 and two misdemeanor counts of discharging
pollutants into the water of the United States in violation of
sections 301(a) and 309(c)(1) of the Clean Water Act.22 At the time of
the indictment section 1319(c) provided for criminal sanctions for "any
person" who "willfully or negligently" violated section 1311(a) or any
NPDES permit.2 2 2  Defendant, in arguing against his convictions for
discharging pollutants, claimed first that he was not a "person" as
contemplated by sections 1319(c) and 1362(5) of the Clean Water Act, and
second, that the government's evidence was insufficient to prove that he
"willfully or negligently" discharged pollutants in violation of the city's
NPDES permit.2
23
In the context of the first claim, defendant contended that an
"individual" was subject to section 1319(c)'s criminal sanctions for NPDES
permit violations only if he was the permittee. 2' The court roundly
rejected this contention for reasons of statutory construction.225 In the
context of the second claim, the defendant conceded that the illegal
discharges occurred but contended that the government did not present
evidence linking the discharges to willful or negligent conduct on his
part.226 He argued that instead, he was convicted solely by virtue of his
position as director of public utilities for the City of Enid.227
217. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
218. 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
219. 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
220. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
221. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1319(c)(1).
222. United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1418.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1419.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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The court in Brittain disclaimed a responsible corporate officer
theory in a footnote stating, "Although defendant may have been subject
to prosecution pursuant to section 1319(c) as a 'responsible corporate
officer' because of his position with the City of Enid, the jury was not
presented with such a theory." The court then went on to espouse an
attenuated responsible corporate officer theory in another fashion stating
in pertinent part:
We believe that the government met its burden in this case.
The record reveals that defendant had primary operational
responsibility for the treatment plant . . . and that he
physically observed both of the NPDES permit violations in
question.... The plant supervisor testified that defendant
repeatedly instructed him not to report the violations to the
EPA as required by the NPDES permit . . . the evidence
reveals that he willfully allowed the discharges to continue
unabated and unreported. Contrary to defendant's argument
the jury considered more evidence than simply evidence of
his position of responsibility. In this case, the jury
considered evidence of specific conduct which allowed the
illegal discharges to occur. As the Third Circuit has noted,
'the Government [does] not have to present evidence of
someone turning on a valve or diverting wastes in order to
establish a willful violation of 1311(a) and 1319(c).' 228
While the defendant did appear to have actual knowledge apart
from his position, the partial reliance of the court on his operational
responsibility for the treatment plant indicates the impact of the responsible
corporate officer theory.
C. Collective knowledge doctrine
Just as the government has been making inroads into the traditional
mens rea limitations on individual liability, government prosecutions of
public welfare offenses appear to have weakened the respondeat superior
doctrine of corporate criminal liability. Corporations have been held
responsible for the collective knowledge of all of their individual agents
228. Id. at 1420 (citing United States v. Frezzo Bros. Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1129 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980)).
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under a "collective knowledge" theory. The First Circuit stated in United
States v. Bank of New England, N.A.229 that because modem corporations
"compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties
and operations into smaller components," the corporation's state of mind
with regard to regulatory offenses must be the "aggregate of those
components. " 23 0
VI. THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS
In 1986 EPA issued a policy statement encouraging the use of
audits to help regulated companies comply with environmental laws and
identify and correct violations. 231 EPA enforcement policy was to
consider "on a case-by-case basis," the honest and genuine efforts of
regulated entities to avoid and promptly correct violations and underlying
environmental problems.232
EPA enforcement settlements appear to favor environmental
auditing. In addition to encouraging the development of corporate auditing
programs, EPA has promoted administrative, civil and criminal settlements
that require ongoing environmental audits. EPA has broad authority to
negotiate an audit provision in a consent decree as part of its authority to
require self-monitoring as a remedy for violators.233
On July 1, 1991, the Department of Justice issued a policy
statement concerning environmental audits. The statement provided as
follows:
It is the policy of the Department of Justice to encourage
self-auditing, self-policing and voluntary disclosure of
environmental violations by the regulated community by
indicating that these activities are viewed as mitigating
factors in the Department's exercise of criminal
environmental enforcement discretion. This document is
intended to describe the factors that the Department of
Justice considers in deciding whether to bring a criminal
prosecution for a violation of an environmental statute, so
229. 821 F.2d 844 856 (lst Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
230. Id.
231. See EPA, Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25004 (July 9,
1986).
232. Id. at 25007.
233. 33 U.S.C. § 1318; 42 U.S.C. § 7414. ABA-ALI, Envtl. Audits (April 1991).
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that such prosecutions do not create a disincentive to or
undermine the goal of encouraging critical self-auditing,
self-policing and voluntary disclosure.2
The DOJ Statement was designed to encourage self-auditing by giving the
regulated community a sense of certain factors which influence
prosecutorial discretion.235 Environmental audits are viewed by DOJ as
an important part of a larger compliance program.236
Courts have included audit requirements in sentences imposed on
corporations. Attorney General Thornburgh noted in his keynote address
at the 1991 Department of Justice Environmental Law Enforcement
Conference237 that Unichem Corporation, in addition to being fined $1.5
million for three felony violations under RCRA, was also sentenced to "an
unspecified period of probation, during which its engineers must conduct
an environmental audit ... at its three blending facilities.
'
"
238
Legislatures are also promoting environmental auditing as a
compliance mechanism. In New Jersey, for example, Assembly Bill No.
1726, the Comprehensive Environmental Crimes Enforcement Act of 1991,
would authorize the imposition of probation and appointment of an
environmental monitor during the term of the company's probation to
propose new methods of deterring recurrence of the corporation's unlawful
conduct.239 The proposed federal Environmental Crimes Act of 1989
would have required a court to place an organization convicted of a felony,
or repeated misdemeanors, on probation and to require that the
organization pay for an audit as a condition of probation."4 A vigorous
voluntary compliance program can serve as a mitigating factor or may
persuade enforcement agencies not to prosecute.
A. Costs and Risks of Environmental Audits
Notwithstanding the clear benefits of environmental audits, a
number of risks do exist. For example, once a violation is discovered, the
company and its management may face the risk of criminal or civil
234. ABA-ALI, Envtl. Audits 1 (April 1991).
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 45, 51 and accompanying text.
237. See Thornburgh, supra note 5.
238. Id.
239. N.J. A.B. 1726 (1990) (not yet enacted).
240. H.R. 3641, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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prosecution until and unless the violation is corrected. Another risk arises
when an audit produces findings which must be reported to environmental
agencies under federal, state or local reporting statutes.
B. Protection against risks involved in environmental auditing
The risks of an environmental auditing program can be minimized
if certain actions are taken.
1. Action regarding voluntary disclosure and cooperation resulting from
environmental auditing
With regard to the risk that voluntary disclosure will result in
criminal sanctions, defendant corporations may preclude such sanctions if
their disclosures and cooperation are voluntary, timely and complete as
suggested by the July 1991 DOJ statement." A recent case concerning
defense contract auditing may be instructive. In United States v. Rockwell
International Corp.,242 a defense contractor unlawfully obtained double
reimbursement for the same costs under two Air Force contracts. The
contractor then prepared a misleading internal memorandum. 3 In 1985,
the government audited the contracts and referred the matter to the
Department of Justice. 2" In 1986, the Department of Defense ("DOD")
announced a voluntary disclosure program for defense contracts.2
Subsequently, the contractor contacted the government and indicated that
it believed violations of its business ethics had occurred.246  The
contractor presented a report which revealed the details of the pricing. 24 7
DOJ then noted its intention to seek a criminal indictment.248 The
contractor argued that it believed the prospective indictments resulted from
its "commitment to voluntary disclosure and efforts to implement a
meaningful self-governance program," and went on to challenge the
subsequent indictment.249 The government contended that the fraud
became evident as a result of the government's audit conducted before the
241. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
242. 924 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1991).
243. Id. at 930.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 929.
246. Id. at 931.
247. Id. at 931.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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voluntary disclosure program was even announced and that the contractor
had no standing to assert that the government failed to follow its
guidelines in administering the voluntary disclosure program. 2 0  The
district court agreed.25' In affirming the district court's decision, the
Ninth Circuit stated:
The Voluntary Disclosure Program was announced on July
24, 1986 in a letter to major defense contractors from the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Howard Taft, IV.
According to the letter, voluntary disclosures of wrongdoing
coupled with contractor cooperation and corrective
measures, would be viewed as 'strong indications of an
attitude of contractor integrity even in the wake of
disclosures of potential criminal liability. [The Department
of Defense] will consider such cooperation as an important
factor in any decision that the department takes. . . . On
July 17, 1987, the Department of Justice circulated
guidelines to the office of the U.S. Attorney for use with
the Voluntary Disclosure Program .... The ... criteria.
. . provided [] give guidance to U.S. Attorneys and do not
establish any rights for corporations being reviewed under
the Voluntary Disclosure Program .... A critical part of
measuring integrity under the program is the timeliness with
which contractors come forward. 52
The Taft letter states:
The contractors understand the Department's view that early
voluntary disclosure, coupled with full cooperation and
complete access to necessary records, are strong indications
of an attitude of contractor integrity even in the wake of
disclosures of potential criminal liability.253
250. Id. at 932.
251. Id. at 929.
252. Id. at 933.
253. Id.
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The Rockwell opinion should not chill corporate audit programs.
Rather, it should promote voluntary, proactive compliance programs which
include a responsible auditing component.
2. Establishing and maintaining privileged information
The auditing process may create documentation that is or should be
regarded as subject to attorney-client privilege. In-house counsel often
must provide business advice as well as legal advice with respect to
matters under investigation and may be viewed as a business advisor rather
than an attorney. For example, in United States v. Chevron,' the court
rejected a claim of attorney-client privilege and ordered production of audit
reports, finding that Chevron had failed to demonstrate that its in-house
counsel had been acting in a legal capacity when she participated in an
audit and that the communications pertained primarily to legal assistance.
In order for an audit report to fall within the scope of the attorney-
client privilege, counsel should emphasize the legal nature of the report to
company employees. Before beginning the audit report, counsel should
explain the privilege to employees and should stress that the information
is necessary to assist the company in obtaining proper legal advice on its
compliance with environmental regulations or in anticipation of
enforcement proceedings. Counsel should clearly mark the final audit
report as privileged. Ideally, all employees and consultants should report
directly to counsel. Counsel should also limit distribution of audit reports.
Even these actions will not guarantee the success of an attorney-
client privilege claim. Some courts have held that investigative reports are
only privileged if prepared in anticipation of litigation,255 but at least one
court has applied the privilege to reports prepared in an effort to avoidlitigation.25
VII. CONCLUSION
254. 757 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
255. Binks Mfg. Co. v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1120 (7th Cir.
1983); Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., No. 87 C
8439, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13004, at 10 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 1989).
256. Herbert v. Lando, 596 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D. N.Y. 1984), remanded on other
grounds, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 441 U.S.
153 (1979).
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Environmental crime may be the crime of the 1990s. Legislators
and prosecutors will continue to reflect society's concern with
environmental quality and its preoccupation with finding a few visible
culprits. Corporations and corporate officers will have to shoulder much
of the blame. Targeting will expand to include public utilities and
government agencies. The investigative and prosecutorial infrastructure
will continue to grow. Many cases will involve no actual environmental
harm, but will focus on technical violations which the government
perceives as undermining the regulatory program. Potential harm will
become as important as actual harm. New criminal responsibility doctrines
will emerge and evolve making a successful defense strategy more
difficult. As a result, corporations will be forced to adopt and implement
strong, proactive environmental compliance programs.
